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The Role and Structure of Credit
THE state in the Soviet Union has complete control over all types
of credit, operating chiefly through a single agency, the State
Bank. The aggregate volume of credit is determined by the pro-
duction and distribution goals set in real terms.1 When physical
plans are revised, related credit plans must be modified accord-
ingly. Under the pre-Reform system, the primary role of banks
was to provide working capital to the state-owned sector of the
economy.2 Prior to the 1965 Reform, the significance of bank
credit was only marginal in fixed capital formation, and in a slow
uptrend in the farm sector.
Volume and Composition of Credit
The total volume of credit is considerably smaller in the Soviet
Union than in the United States, and the range of end uses for
which credit is available is much narrower. The contrast is high-
''The basic function of Soviet credit is in the planned use of the resources of the
socialist economy and in speeding up the tempo of the enlarged socialist production' is a
standard statement in textbooks, speeches, and articles by Soviet government and State
Bank officials.
The private segment of the economy, which sells its output at free market prices, is
smaller than in any other country in the socialist bloc. It is ignored by Soviet economists,
official statistics, and the State Bank.
2For a discussion of ambiguities of "working capital" as used in the Soviet Union, see
Becker [loll. See also Bychkov [20], Campbell [106], and Podolski [1391. For a further
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lighted in Table 6.1, which compares credit outstanding at the end
of 1969 in the two countries.3
In the Soviet Union, the total amount of credit outstanding at
the end of 1969 was equivalent to about one-fifth of the gross
social product. By contrast, the amount of credit in use in the
United States was nearly double the value of GNP. Even adding
an estimated 35.7 billion dollars for de facto trade credit available
to state enterprises, total credit outstanding in the Soviet Union
comes to less than $165 billion, or only one-eighth of the compara-
ble U.S. figure.4 In the United States, the overwhelming bulk of
credit is extended by deposit institutions. The credit not evi-
denced by credit market instruments ("other credit") mainly
represents trade credit, which alone is almost double the amount
of all loans extended by the Soviet banking system.
Loans to the federal government are excluded from both totals.
In the Soviet Union the bulk of such borrowing consisted of bonds
placed with the population, while in the United States, govern-
ment securities are held by business firms and financial institu-
tions as well as by individuals. The bulk of the total working
capital of the Soviet economy (excluding kolkhozes) consisted of
amounts due to various creditors. This category mainly includes
accounts (including those past due) payable to other state enter-
prises rather than merchandise purchased on credit terms, as well
as amounts due the Treasury (and usually payable within a few
days) and other creditors.
Short-term lending still accounts for the overwhelming bulk of
all credit, as illustrated in Table 6.2, hovering around 90 percent in
recent years. The authorities set the uniform standard rules for
the issuance of credit, specifying in great detail the activities
qualifying for credit financing (i.e., collection of drafts, or pay-
ment of taxes). Before 1959 short-term credit extended directly to
3Comparative statistics like those presented in Table 6. 1are subject to a variety of
limitations. For instance, U.S. figures include loans to foreigners, while Soviet foreign
indebtedness, limited to foreign governments and extended solely by the Treasury, is
omitted from the data in Table 6.1. Melkov [61], Ch. II contains a brief but valuable
historical review of the credit activities and of the liabilities of the State Bank.























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Volume and Composition of Credit 109
Notesto Table 6.1
SOURCES: [861,1969, pp. 774—779; and FederalReserve Board, FlowofFunds
Accounts: Financial Assets and LiabilitiesOutstanding,1959—1971,Washington,
D.C., 1972.
NOTE: Components may not add to totals because of rounding. Rubles are converted
at the rate of 1 ruble =$1.1.
Excludes financial business and loans extended to foreigners.
Includes farm business other than farmers.
Includes state farms, excludes credit to retail trade for financing household pur-
chases.
dIncludesnonprofit organizations.
Covers construction cooperatives and individuals.
Includes "other mortgages," security credit, and miscellaneous bank loans.
°Long-termonly.
Very small amount of loans to municipalities for improvements included with state
enterprises.
the agricultural sector was financed almost exclusively via state
procurement organizations outside the credit system.5 The uses
of short-term credit, by major economic sector and by main
purpose, are illustrated in Tables 6.3 and 6.4.
While the relative importance of long-term loans has been on
the rise since 1965, their share in the total credit volume at the end
of 1971—at least about 17 percent—was roughly the same as in
1940. The increase from 1965 to 1971 was mainly due to a larger
credit flow to collective farms and cooperative housing. In con-
trast to the pre-1959 period, when the volume of long-term credit
granted to kolkhozes had been very small, total long-term lending
to agriculture, including credit for the acquisition of livestock,
averaged close to 6.5 billion in the 1959—1965 period, and rose to
8.4 billion in 1968.6
While it makes credit available to municipal governments for
financing municipal services, the Bank does not extend credit to
the national government7 and to the relatively small number of
farmers not on collective farms.
5See also Parchenko and associates [64].
°For more details on long-term lending to agriculture, see Yunik and Miseyuk [91], pp.
153ff and Pzybyla [247]. Golev [361 and Katsenelenbaum [44] review the situation prior to
the changes made in 1958. Both sources contain a considerable amount of statistical data;
Golev includes a valuable historical introduction.
1Credit to enterprises for financing their payments to the budget in effect constitutes
indirect credit to the national government: the budgetary surplus resulting from such
payments is. in effect, a counterpart of bank loans. This type of credit arises from the1933 1940 1950 1960 1965 1970 1971
Short Term
Industry 2.1 7.0 14.6 23.6 35.5 37.2
Agriculture (including
kolkhozes) 0.2 0.6 3.0 4.6 9.5 12.0
Kolkizozes a a 0.7 0.4 2.5 3.4
Wholesale trade5 1.6 6.1 16.3 25.7 35.1 38.6
Total" 1.1 5.6 17.342.7
Long Term
68.0 108.2 115.4
Collective farms 0.1 0.2 0.7 2.4 3.9 10.3 11.6
State and cooperative
enterprises and
organizations" 0.5 0.7 0.4 1.3 7.1 9.4
Households 0.1 0.6 1.0 0.8 0.6 0.6
Total 0.1 0.8 2.0 3.8 6.0 18.1 21.6
SouRcE: [86], 1971, p. 486: 1967, pp. 891 and 893: 1968, pp. 779 and 781.
NOTE: Details may not add up to totals because of rounding. Wholesale trade organiza-
tions of industrial ministries are included under "industry."
aLessthan 100 million.
"Supplyand purchase organizations, including those purchasing farm output.
Includes other segments of the economy.
dIncludescooperative housing, which rose from 0.02 at the end of 1952 to 2.3 at the end
of 1971.
In the household sector, credit for financing purchases of con-
sumer goods is not available from the banking system at all, in
contrast with several socialist countries where savings banks
make loans to finance such purchases. However, since 1958
stores of the state retail trade organization have been selling
certain goods on credit.8 (See Table 6.5.)
Installment buying of consumer goods was introduced at a time
when supply conditions had improved sufficiently to make cer-
peculiar accounting arrangements that are a feature of socialist economies. For example, in
each accounting period (which may be as short as five days), the proportion of the profits
the given enterprise should achieve under its plan is automatically paid into the national
budget. If this profit has not been earned, the depletion in working capital may have to be
offset by a bank loan.
8For details, see II'in and Koryagin [240]. See also Novoselov and Blyukova [196]
and, on pawnshops as a source of consumer funds, Churkina [174].
110 The Role and Structure of Credit
TABLE 6.2
Loans by All Banks, Selected Years
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Short-term Loans of the State Bank, by Purpose,
Selected Years




Purpose 1941 1951 1961 1966 1971
Carrying of inventory 3.3 10.2 30.2 48.6 75.9
Production expenditures 0.1 0.3 0.6 0.8 2.6
On payment documents in
collection channels 1.8 3.9 6.7 8.8 11.5
To meet payment obligations 0.1 0.9 1.0 2.0 2.3
Forotherpurposes 0.2 1.3 2.1 3.1 3.7







Nom: Detail may not add up to totals because of rounding.
tamrelatively expensive items amply available. These were put
on the list of goods eligible for credit sales, a list that has gradually
lengthened over the past several years. Variations may occur
among cities and regions, depending on supply conditions and on
the accumulation of excess stocks for certain items. In 1960,
annual credit sales amounted to not much more than three rubles
per capita; a decade later, they were about five times as large. The
share of all nonfood commodities sold on the installment plan
increased from 1.8 percent in 1960 to 5.7 percent in The
importance of consumer durables, including motorcycles, has
grown at the expense of clothing and footwear items, which still
represent substantial expenditures in relation to the average
Soviet income.
Terms available to individual purchasers depend on salary,
level and structure of family expenditures, and other household
characteristics, as well as on supply conditions. Differentiation in
interest rates is related to maturity, the rate varied from 1 percent
for loans up to six months to 2 percent for twelve-month loans
(the maximum maturity available) in 1960. Loans are repaid either
directly at the store from which the purchase was made, or by the
9For retail sales in1961 and 1963, and details on share of credit sales for various





























made, or by the
alit sales for various
[236].
Credit Sales of Consumer Goods, by Category, 1960, 1965,
and 1971
(in millions of rubles)
Year Clothing Household Goodsu Other Total
1960 364 223 47 633
1965 1,152 1,631 588 3,372
1971 1,146 2,187 1,434 3,766
SOURCE: [86], 1972, p. 395. No earlier data available.
NOTE: Data cover goods sold in state and cooperative stores. Details may not
add up to totals because of rounding.
"Goods of a cultural and household character' (TV, refrigerators, etc.).
employing enterprise, which may remit the full amount and then
deduct installment payments from the purchaser's paycheck, pos-
sibly on more liberal terms than those extended by stores. Some
large enterprises borrow from the State Bank in order to make
immediate settlements with retail organizations for all purchases
of their employees.
Housing shortages have plagued the Soviet economy since its
beginnings, especially after the large-scale destruction of housing
stock during World War II. Yet credit was not available for
multiple dwellings until the early sixties. Indeed, prior to 1962,
credit was available only for the construction of individual dwell-
ings in rural areas and small towns. Since that year, however, the
Investment Bank has been making long-term loans available to
cooperatives formed for the purpose of building multidwelling
apartments for their members in urban centers. This is an impor-
tant change, given the long waiting periods involved in obtaining
apartments in municipal housing and in dwellings erected by
factories or various other large employers, such as government
offices. Residential construction undertaken mainly by municipal-
ities is financed via their budgets, and that by large enterprises,
via their funds."° The importance of cooperatives
shows rapid growth in the housing picture: in 1966, about 6 to 7
°Since 1966, enterprises can obtain credit for the construction of dwellings for their
staff in amounts matching the funds available for this purpose from retained profits
allocated to the "fund for staff benefits" (see Chapter 5).114 The Role and Structure of Credit
percent of all housing space was provided by housing coopera-
tives, and by the end of 1971, loans outstanding to cooperatives,
at 2.3 billion rubles, had more than quadrupled their 1962 volume.
Construction of individual homes is permitted in rural areas on
land made available by municipal authorities. Though credit
granted for this purpose has been microscopic by U.S. standards,
in the 1955—1966 period such construction accounted for no less
than 27 percent of all dwelling space built.'1 In the years between
the reforms of 1930—1932 and 1965, more than nine-tenths of the
credit extended or outstanding each year was to the state-owned
enterprises. The balance of this chapter deals with credit to the
socialized sector, which, even after 1965, consisted overwhelm-
ingly of short-term loans.
Credit Policy
The closest that official Soviet doctrine has ever come to formu-
lating a credit policy is the set of "five principles of socialist
credit," spelled out in numerous monographs and textbooks.
These stipulate that such credit should be planned, specific,
secured, repayable, and with a fixed maturity. In actual practice
provision is also made for supplementary "unplanned credits,"
extended in excess of the planned volume where a refusal to
exceed set limits would merely aggravate the underlying difficul-
ties. The requirement that each loan be made for a specific
purpose and be identifiable as to end use resulted, under the initial
modus operandi of the system, in the granting of separate loans for
different specified purposes. The principle that the loan must be
repayable serves to stress the distinction between credit and
nonrepayable grants. While the bank is also expected to deter-
mine whether the expected flow of payments will be adequate to
retire the loan, this is a purely formal rule, given the automatic
nature of most categories of loans granted.
These principles provide the rationale for detailed administra-
tive control, but no basis for a credit policy to regulate aggregate
"For details, see Gerashchenko [291, P. 343, Plotnikov [68], pp. 159—160, Yunik and





































Bank does not h
12[27],Vol.1, pp.Credit Policy 115
demand. Soviet monetary theory denies that in a socialist econ-
omy there is room for credit policy. The Finansovo-Kreditnyi
Slovar' (Financial and Credit Dictionary) was published in 1958
and 1962 by the official publishing house specializing in financial
literature. It defines credit policy as a "system of measures in the
area of credit designed to secure the economic interests of the
ruling class." "Credit restrictions" are described as "limitations or
reductions in the volume of credit, which are put into effect by
capitalist banks and bourgeois states," and "credit expansion" is
"enlargement of credit, put into effect by capitalist banks and the
bourgeoisstate, which exceeds the growth of production,
stimulates overproduction and the coming about of economic
crises."2 The dictionary is silent about its role in a socialist
economy except to state that "in the Soviet Union credit policy
corresponds to the tasks that the government places before the
country in each phase of the construction of socialism and com-
munism." Indeed, circumstances may make it necessary to
tolerate modification of these principles as indicated, for instance,
by the large amount of past-due loans or to ignore them altogether
by using credit for payrolls and collective farm payments to
members, for example.
In practice, the actual implementation of these five principles
has resulted in arrangements whereby, once certain targets or
conditions stipulated in the applicable plans are met, credit is
available almost automatically and at a fixed cost. The enterprise
obtains a loan by filing a request, which the bank official pro-
cesses by merely ascertaining whether the nature of the underly-
ing transaction qualifies the applicant for obtaining credit accom-
modations within the limits set in the underlying plans. These
arrangements obviously provide no incentive for management
and personnel of the banking system to improve service. On the
other hand, the Bank cannot close an unprofitable account,
either.
Before the Reform, access to bank credit did not depend on
profitability; indeed, credit-worthiness is a concept hardly appli-
cable to state-owned enterprises. In extending credit, the State
































12[271, Vol. 1, pp.584—585 and591.116 TheRole and Structure of Credit
appraisal. Neither its clients nor its own liquidity are relevant ing the rules,
factors. Its criterion for measuring a borrower's performance is side adminjstra
his success in meeting production, inventory, unit cost, profit, embodied in
and various other real and financial targets stipulated in the The principi
economic plans. was establishe
A working capital shortage in any given enterprise can be operating
remedied either by granting it more credit, or by adding to its thirties.14 Succ
working capital via transfers from the budget from other enter- ment, which cc
prises under the same ministry or from "higher echelon" organi- restrictive rule:
zations in the economic administration. Provision is also made for on favorable te
access to bank credit in order to finance unforeseen expenditures of their own) i
forreal assets, such as bulges in raw materials inventories which capital, and
occur when deliveries are ahead of schedule or above planned bursements
targets. fled conditions
Geared to the flow of material output, actual changes in loans Granting a
outstanding almost automatically reflect deviations from planned liberal terms in
targets, shortfalls as well as "plan overfulfihiment." On the other performance. I
hand, accumulation of balances in the account of an enterprise targets of prodi
may result in a request to repay a loan before maturity, or in the ing the planne(
transfer of such "redundant" funds (by order of a supervisory achieving incre
administrative organization—a g/avk or ob'edinen&ve) to some gets set.
other enterprise or economic organization. Credit sanctf
Rationing of credit, like that of material resources, operates via measures appli
administrative decisions that filter down to individual borrowers banks) to loans
through a pseudo-banking process. When aggregatecredit enterprise's ov
demand exceeds the amount of credit provided for in administra- to assure fulfill
tively determined "credit plans," the State Bank determines the safeguard the ii
order of queuing.'3 of sanctions is
Changes in credit availability in the Soviet Union, which in to conform wit
nonsocialist countries are typically signaled by changes in the conflicts with ti
discount rate, have, instead, generally involved the addition of sanctions are
specific activities to the list of those eligible for bank financing, as echelon econc
well as other liberalizations of procedure. None of the instruments intercede with I
andtechniques used in nonsocialist countries, such as fractional subjected to m
reserve requirements or the discount mechanism, are use. In fact, sures for reme
variations in the availability of credit over time have depended become a prol
as much on the degree of flexibility in credit administration, in- organization si
cluding "bending" of rules, on the laxity of bank officials in apply-
'4For details, inclu
'3See Garvy in tilO] and [117]. Bank, see Shenger [7Credit Policy 117
ingthe rules, and on their readiness to respond to local and out-
side administrative pressures as on formal quantitative changes
embodied in financial plans.
The principle of rewarding exceptionally efficient enterprises
was established in 1954, while credit sanctions against poorly
operating units date back to the credit reforms of the early
thirties.t4 Successful enterprises are eligible for favorable treat-
ment, which consists of reduced red tape and lenience in applying
restrictive rules rather than lower rates. They may receive loans
on favorable terms to meet contingencies (arising through no fault
of their own) that result in a diminution of their own working
capital, and may now also obtain additional loans for wage dis-
bursements and inventories above plan limits under certain speci-
fied conditions.
Granting a privileged status, additional credit facilities, or more
liberal terms involves assessment of the quality of an enterprise's
performance. Before the Reform, this meant meeting the physical
targets of production plans and the degree of success in maintain-
ing the planned levels of costs per unit of output, as well as in
achieving increases in labor productivity in accordance with tar-
gets set.
Credit sanctions, on the other hand, are direct administrative
measures applied by the State Bank (and the two specialized
banks) to loans as well as to current (clearing) accounts when the
enterprise's overall performance is unsatisfactory. They are used
to assure fulfillment of the economic plan rather than merely to
safeguard the interests of the bank as a lender. The usual purpose
of sanctions is to reduce the enterprise's volume of indebtedness
to conform with the applicable norms. However, whenever this
conflicts with the need to keep the particular enterprise operating,
sanctions are unlikely to be pushed very far. Indeed, higher-
echelon economic and localpoliticalauthorities frequently
intercede with the bank on behalf of enterprises in danger of being
subjected to more stringent lending terms. Also, concrete mea-
sures for remedying the situation that caused the borrower to
become a problem case is normally initiated by the economic
organization supervising the enterprise's operations, such as a
'4For details, including statistical data on the application of credit sanctions by the State































are use. In fact,
have depended
iiinistration, in-
fficials in apply-118 The Role and Structure of Credit
ministry, or by the political authorities, if the enterprise is con- purposes, givin
trolled by a local government unit. Bank offices.
A widely used form of sanctions is to put poor performers on a been takingp;
special regime including typically, pressure to liquidate excessive accounts and c
inventories or to complete production held up for lack of parts, ment
increased control over all transfers of funds, and imposition of a subaccounts
rigid system of priorities for payments from the bank account. In mate outcome
some cases the Bank may require, for future loans or renewals, a and separate l(
guarantee by the higher-echelon authority supervising the enter- prise. This w
prise, such as the ministry of the local administration, as the case allocation of a
may be. There are only few cases, however, where the guarantor bank financing
actually has to make good on the obligations of the enterprise; discussion.
more frequently, direct administrative action is taken to improve Finally, eve
the delinquent's performance. lending was us
More extreme measures involve suspension of access to all preferences. Ii
liberal forms of credit, the take-over of collateral (goods), corn- trade organizal
plete withdrawal of all credit facilities, and, as a last resort, the (if necessary,
forced sale of the collateral and, ultimately, declaration of bank- rest of the wor
ruptcy.'5 The more severe the sanction, the higher the level of penalty rate.
rj
bankauthorities from which authorization to apply it must be introduced ag
obtained, products for w
Short of extreme measures, credit sanctions, particularly pen- provision was
alty rates, have proved largely ineffective under the standard organizations t
system. Where fulfillment of physical production goals and other which have be
"real" targets constitute the main success indicators, with man- On the wholi
agement having only limited interest in the size of profits, pay-
1
lastyears prioi
ment of penalty rates is clearly not much of an inhibition. More- ments where
over, in the last analysis, the increased interest cost is borne by actual perform
the national budget and affects neither the most relevant success essentially on
indicators (set in physical terms before the Reform) nor the on negotiations
income of the management group. Contrary to expectations, the State Bank bra
Reform has not provided the machinery through which penalty techniques ren
rate payments can affect the compensation of managers and the
fringe benefits of the staff.
However, a trend toward greater flexibility in credit administra-
tion has been developing since the mid-fifties. This includes a
very gradual shift from the multiplicity of separate "objects" for SHORT-TERM C
credit extension (specific purposes) toward credit for broader
Under the s
[58],pp. 113—132. basic functionsCredit to State Enterprises 119
purposes,giving greater latitude to the managers of the local State
Bank offices. Also, a gradual simplification in accounting has
been taking place through merging the various special loan
accounts and channeling receipts more directly into loan repay-
ment transactions. Since the 1965 Reform the consolidation of
subaccounts has made considerable progress. Logically, its ulti-
mate outcome would be the complete consolidation of the current
and separate loan accounts into a single account for each enter-
prise. This would facilitate the determination of the efficient
allocation of a given unit's working capital and its overall need for
bank financing. Proposals along these lines are currently under
discussion.
Finally, even before the inauguration of the Reform, bank
lending was used to achieve greater responsiveness to consumer
preferences. Increasingly, the Bank has sought to induce retail
trade organizations to reduce or liquidate low-quality inventories
(if necessary, by cutting prices), by means not unknown in the
rest of the world, such as refusal to renew loans or renewal at a
penalty rate. Thus, as early as 1959 restrictive measures were
introduced against trade organizations accumulating finished
products for which there was insufficient demand. A year later,
provision was made for the extension of special credits to trade
organizations that take losses by marking down prices of goods
which have become outmoded or whose quality has deteriorated.
On the whole, the increased lending flexibility introduced in the
last years prior to the Reform mainly served to facilitate adjust-
ments where discrepancies arose between physical plans and
actual performance. Availability of credit continued to depend
essentially on high-echelon administrative decisions rather than
on negotiations between the borrower and the lending officers of a
State Bank branch, so that application of the more liberal credit
techniques remained of limited significance until 1965.
Under the standard system, short-term credit performs three

































Credit to State Enterprises
SHORT-TERM CREDITT
120 The Role and Structure of Credit
matically financing peak working capital needs (mostly through specific purpos
inventory credits);it assures prompt replacement of working pose, with a nj
capital after completion of production (through semi-automatic bEe. As newpi
crediting of collection float); and it provides an added means for were added, t1
controlling not only the financial performance of each borrowing For each
enterprise, but of many other assets of its activities as well. tion of the con
During the entire period between the credit reforms of 1930— of the mode of
1932 and World War II, the growth of short-term credit exceeded purpose was
the increase in output. of course, the
Two basic types of inventory loans are made: one is geared to necessities of
the level of stocks and the other to the flow ("turnover") of loans that neat
goods. Credit geared to the level of inventories, which was the categories of"
predominant form through the early fifties, involves a separate dinary" credit
application for each loan and is granted up to a "limit" set for tive to providir
each enterprise (comparable to a credit line granted by commer- whether they
cial banks in the West). changed to an
The proper amount of total working capital and the proportion the matter is t
init of the enterprises' own resources, designated as "own procedures of
funds," are determined by central authorities for each individual was required t
industry. The proportion of inventories of raw materials and of tion, whether i
goods in production to be financed by the enterprises own work- tive failures, m
ing capital is governed by "norms" worked out in resources.
great detail for all industries, products and locations. Norms may Flexibility
be varied for individual enterprises and are revised from time to increased, sin
time, usually for specific industries. They are usually calculated transfer unuse
in such a way as to require seasonal peak needs as well as some prises of the sa
part of the basic year-round inventory to be financed by bank planned credit
credit. Thus changes in the volume of credit are for the most part ministry has be
the counterpart of changes in the volume of inventories, unless are made to en
planning authorities decide to change the relative share of enter- The alternat
prise funds and bank credit in the carrying of inventories. The tried in 1936.
setting and modifications of these norms are used as a means of 1934 (but little
achieving specific operating goals, such as a decrease in the establishment
inventory-output ratio or optimal degree of administrative control ing line of cr
over the activities of individual enterprises. Indeed, much of the documents are
discussion in Soviet publications about credit tends to revolve a stipulated pai
around the proper determination of the proper share of credit in
6
thefinancing of various types of inventories. different purpose hei
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Credit to State Enterprises 121
specific purpose involved compartmentalization of loans by pur-
pose, with a rigid definition of the purposes that were permissa-
ble. As new purposes for granting credit ("objects of crediting")
were added, the number of separate loan categories multiplied.'6
For each newly eligible "object" there was still detailed stipula-
tion of the conditions under which the loan could be obtained, and
of the mode of repayment. Credit could not be extended unless its
purpose was specifically mentioned on an approved list. Actually,
of course, the rigor of logic was frequently circumvented by the
necessities of practice, and thus, in addition to the categories of
loans that neatly fitted the planned movement of goods, various
categories of "transitional," "special," "interim," and "extraor-
dinary" credit were introduced. Basically there was no alterna-
tive to providing such funds if a chain reaction was to be avoided;
whether they were provided under special headings or merely
changed to an overdue credit account mattered little. The fact of
the matter is that in spite of the lofty principles and elaborate
procedures of "socialist credit," automatic, extension of credit
was required under the standard system to validate any distor-
tion, whether it resulted from uncontrollable causes, administra-
tive failures, misjudgment in planning, or mismanagement of real
resources.
Flexibilityofcreditadministrationhas been somewhat
increased, since the late fifties, by authorizing bank offices to
transfer unused credit quotas among territories and among enter-
prises of the same industry. Also, 5 percent of the total volume of
planned credits earmarked for any major geographic area or
ministry has been placed in an unassigned fund, from which loans
are made to enterprises that perform exceptionally well.
The alternative method—gearing credit to output—was first
tried in 1936. "Crediting on turnover," originally introduced in
1934 (but little used in the following thirty years), which requires
establishment of a "special loan account," is similar to a revolv-
ing line of credit.'7 The bank pays the seller when shipping
documents are forwarded to it by the buyer, and sales receipts, or
a stipulated part of such receipts, are credited to the special loan
'6According to Melkov [61], PP. 129—130, a pharmacy can obtain loans under 17
different purpose headings and an alcohol factory under not fewer than 23.
'7For details, see Melkov [61], Chap. 3, and Pessel' [65], pp. 6—13,122 The Role and Structure of Credit
account. The proportion of credit in the total working capital
remains constant, but it fluctuates seasonally while the volume of
credit changes over time depending on working capital needs.
Loans geared to turnover made very little headway until 1957,
but in recent years they have accounted for 70 to 80 percent of all
short-term inventory credit. Despite the Bank's efforts, and
despite the all encompassing planning and the absence of cyclical
fluctuations, the accumulation of excessive inventories has been a
chronic problem, more severe at some times than at others.
Settlement credit (credit on shipment documents in anticipation
of payment by the buyer) is closely geared to the shipments of
goods, whether raw materials or finished products. Its granting
depends almost entirely on whether the goods received (in the
case of raw materials) or shipped (inthe case of finished
goods) conform to the production plan applicable to the given
enterprise. The volume of settlement credit depends on the
ability of the enterprise to ship goods produced in accordance
with the plan; its extension on the basis of shipping documents is
automatic.
Some loans which the Bank issues are cancelled or taken over
by higher-echelon economic organizations up to the ministerial
level, but the volume of such loans is not reported. Figures for
loans overdue refer to a situation in which the borrower's finan-
cial prospects have not as yet resulted in the intervention of
administrative organizations which supervise.
The State Bank can hardly be left holding bad assets, since,
with few exceptions (such as lending to kolkhozes and to other
cooperatives) a higher-echelon organization can be asked to take
remedial action and to guarantee the credit granted or past due.
But bank assets can be slow, and the volume of overdue loans,
resulting mainly from the inability of individual enterprises to
control inventories of raw materials as well as, in the case of retail
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need to reduce the volume of overdue loans is a recurrent theme
in financial periodicals and official statements.'9
MEDIUM-TERM CREDIT
In spite of the very limited use of medium-term for the financing
of plant and equipment on the state-owned sector, the experience
gained through the use of this technique has no doubt contributed
to the shift from grant to loan financing which constitutes an
important aspect of the reforms begun in 1965.20
"Loans for small mechanization" were introduced in 1932, but
numerous restrictions surrounding their use prevented such lend-
ing from attaining much importance. In principle, only invest-
ments designed to improve technology, rather than break bottle-
necks or increase capacity were eligible for credit financing. The
specific purposes for which investment loans were available
under the standard system include acquisition of machinery or
equipment (1) embodying advanced technology (including auto-
mated equipment) and (2) to increase the output of consump-
tion goods, mainly on the basis of locally available raw materials
or by-products, and (3) for which, for one reason or another, no
provision was made in the plan ("afterthought projects"). One
frequently heard complaint was that investment loans were
available to buy, for instance, an automatic lathe, but not to build
another freight elevator which would have cut costs by a much
larger amount.
In the five years immediately preceding the Reform (1960—
1964), about one-third of all medium-term loans were for automa-
tion, and one-third for machinery replacement and acquisition of
additional equipment. The remainder went largely for investment
connected with the introduction of more advanced technology.
However, some medium-term loans were also made for purposes
not related to improving or enlarging production. For instance,
'For a discussion of past-due loans based on data for the Russian Federal Republic, see
V. Zakharov [210]. The author remarks that while the Bank's statute provides for the
foreclosure of collateral, this is very rarely done, even when loans long overdue are
involved.
20For a detailed discussion of these loans, see Grossman in [143]. For a comparison of
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such credit served in the decade preceding the Reform to build
movie theaters in numbers far exceeding those financed from
budgetary (mostly local soviet) resources.2' Stringent require-
ments were, and still are, attached to such loans, primarily to
prevent consummation of projects which were rejected by the
higher echelon economic and planning authorities for inclusion in
investment plans. The provision that construction expenditure
cannot exceed 15 percent of the total cost of the proposed project
to be bank-financed serves the same purpose. Loans for invest-
ment purposes have a maximum maturity of up to three years,
depending on industry; in practice they are amortized more rap-
idly, on the average within one year, since they are usually made
available only for purposes profitable enough to permit relatively
quick repayment.
The growth of modernization loans had been slow until the
Reform because there was little inducement to borrow, even at
nominal interest cost, as long as investment funds could be
obtained free on a non-returnable grant basis (though perhaps
only next year or later) by having the project included in the
regular investment plan. Further reasons were the delays in
obtaining such loans and the difficulties in acquiring materials and
machinery from the authorities in charge of their allocation. Thus
the use of bank credit to finance fixed investment remained
negligible through the beginning of the 1960s and became of some
importance only with the launching of the Reform.22
The Reform and Credit
The Reform has affected the use of credit in two ways: it has
extended loan financing of fixed investment, and it has further
simplified financing of working capital along the lines initiated in
this direction since the middle fifties. The supply of bank financ-
ing for both purposes was eased by making loans available in
anticipation of retained earnings and depreciation allowances in
future years, thus bridging the time gap between current spending
21See Barkovkiy and Kartashova [9].
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and future income. However, all basic features of the standard
system remain.
Since the Reform, the use of bank credit for carrying invento-
ries is now less restrictive; greater emphasis is placed on credit on
turnover. Such creditis made available to cover normally
between 40 and 50 percent of the planned level of working capital.
This percentage can vary for individual categories of working
capital used by an enterprise (raw materials, fuel, parts, et cetera),
with stipulated exceptions. By the time the Reform was initiated,
the majority of industrial enterprises qualified for the use of such
loans on turnover, but did not take much advantage of them. At
the beginning of 1966, such loans represented only 3'/2percentof
all short-term credit extended by the State Bank.23 Following the
example of some other socialist countries, the State Bank had
begun in 1972 to experiment with credit contracts with individual
enterprises.24
While loans on turnover have expanded, they have by no
means replaced special-purpose loans. Individual enterprises
using loans on turnover may, and typically do, still obtain addi-
tional credits for carrying inventories in excess of planned levels
(norms), for paying debit balances in clearings, and for other
purposes. The amount of credit extended to an enterprise for
working capital purposes remains linked to the degree its produc-
tion plan has been flulfihled, but the total volume of credit available
to it is subject to subsequent negotiations as new facts develop.
Such changes in credit practices as increased lending on the
basis of total turnover are designed to provide greater flexibility in
the use of borrowed funds, and to reduce detailed verifications
and other "documentation." They also give plant managers
somewhat greater latitude, as the role of the authorities inter-
posed between the individual enterprise and the ministry con-
cerned is reduced. Under the new system, enterprises determine
their own working capital requirements, which, once approved by
23Chernyshova [22], pp. 44and 66—67. Seealso Sotnikov and Mezhiborskaya [205],
Zakharov [210].
Garber and Doinikova [176]. Among the voluminous Soviet literature on the
significance of the Reform for credit and banking, see Rurnyantsev and Banich [71],
Bachunn [8], and Dzhavadov [25]. For the impact on credit of reforms initiated simultane-
ously in other socialist countries, see Atlas [7].126 The Role and Structure of Credit Cre(
the higher authorities, cannot be changed during the year unless
the production plan is modified. If an enterprise's working capital
has been impaired because of losses or lower-than-projected prof-
its, the shortfall will no longer be made good through budgetary
appropriations but will have to be rebuilt from future profits.
Enterprises that have depleted their working capital must now
resort to bank credit, on which charges are relatively high and
which must be repaid from future profits. Repayment of such
bank loans, which have a maturity of up to two years, must come
from profits that exceed plan targets. If a given enterprise does
not have higher-than-plan profits, up to 30 percent of the
resources earmarked for the "development fund" must be used to
retire the debt.
All in all, the share of bank credit in the economy's total
working capital at the end of 1969 was considerably higher—at
47.1 percent—than at the end of 1950, when it had constituted
40.4 percent (see Table 6.6). This was due more to the sharp
reduction in accounts payable during the twenty-one years (from
20.1 percent in 1950 to 12.3 percent in 1969) than to the moderate
decline in enterprise funds (from 37.9 to 34.4 percent). While bank
credit showed an uptrend in all branches of the economy, the gain
in its share of total working capital was particularly significant in
manufacturing (at 44.3 percent in 1971, compared with 33.1 per-
cent at the end of 1950), wholesale distribution (at 62.4, versus
52.5 percent in 1950), and organizations purchasing farm products
(at 84.0, up from 64.3 percent during the comparable period).25
The rise in manufacturing presumably reflects the greater use of
credit (rather than budget grants) for working capital, one of the
most significant developments in the credit picture since the early
sixties.26
The role of credit in supplying working capital for the economy
isstill widely debated.27 One of the problems is that, due to
differences in profitability, the rules applying to profit retention
25Mitel'rnan [195],p. 22.
260nthe changes in the role of credit in trade, see Gryzanov [38] and Orlov and
Shimanskiy [631. See also Podolski [139], Appendix D, for statistical data, 1940—1968.
"On the controversy concerning the proper ratio in an enterprise's working capital
between its own resources and bank credit, see Seidenvarg [200] and the numerous
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TABLE 6.6
Structure of Working Capital of State Enterprises
(percentage composition at the end of year)







Bills payable 20.1 14.012.310.6 8.2 5.8 4.5 9.9 11.4





rendered 9.2 7.011.2 8.5 0.4 0.7 3.9 4.7
Bank deposits 6.2 7.0 4.8 5.6 5.2 7.2 3.7 3.8
Accounts
receivable 7.0 7.2 3.4 3.3 3.4 2.7 3.2 4.3
Other 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.6 3.9 1.6 — 0.1
SOURCES: [86], 1968, pp. 750—751 and 1969, pp. 750—751; and [214].
and the policies of supervisory economic administrations result in
excesses of working capital in some enterprises while others find
themselves short and must borrow from the State Bank.
Credit for Agriculture Under the Reform
Lagging productivity in agriculture—in large measure a result of a
half century of neglect on the part of planners and of lack of
incentives for those working on the land—has been one of the
most persistent problems of the Soviet economy. It is not surpris-
ing, therefore, that the first move toward the Reform consisted of
a series of administrative as well as policy changes concerning
agriculture, announced in March 1965, six months before promul-
gation of the parallel measures affecting the rest of the economy.
In particular, steps were taken to alleviate the credit burden on
agriculture. About 1.5 billion rubles of the kolkhozes' long-term
and over half a billion of their short-term bank debt were written
off, and some other obligations were canceled or postponed. The128 The Role and Structure of Credit
various reforms introduced involved price increases for farm
produce, administrative rearrangements, and various organiza-
tional changes, including the gradual shift of sovkhozes to a
business accounting (khozraschet) basis. Many of these measures
aimed at increasing the responsibilities of the chairman of the
kolkhoz and the manager of the sovkhoz paralleling similar mea-
sures in industry, but administrative controls have actually been
reduced only to a minor extent. The role of the State Bank in the
farm sector, however, has increased28 with the growth in direct
lending to agriculture.
Financial incentives play a similar role in the changes affecting
kolkhozes initiated in March 1965 as in various state-owned sec-
tors under the Reform. These changes were a logical development
of a series of significant modifications in the operations of kolk-
hozes introduced in 1953.29 The gradual reduction in the use of the
kolkhozes' own products in compensating members and for pur-
chasing non-labor inputs as well as in discharging obligations
toward the state was accelerated. Simultaneously, the income of
kolkhozes was increased by an upward adjustment of procure-
ment prices paid by state purchasing organizations for various
types of farm products, with a 50 percent supplement paid for
deliveries above plan targets, and by an increase in the output of
individual plots.
A major policy change involved extending working capital
credits directly to kolkhozes rather than via the state purchasing
organizations, thus bringing kolkhoz officials into contact with the
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28See Kotchkaren andGlinsitkiy[182] andLevchuk[189]. Price changes and adminis-
trative efforts toraise productivity are, perhaps, of greater significance than changes of a
purelyfinancial character, which arediscussedin thischapter. The shift toward direct
lendingby the State Bank has entailed large-scale experimentation with alternative meth-
ods of extending credit that involve about 3.000 collective farms differing in size, profitabil-
ity,andlocation.
29For detailed discussion of Soviet agricultural policy, see Strauss [147) and Karcz and
Timoschenko [125]; see also Clarke [226], and Diamond, "Trends in Output, Input and
Factor Productivity in Soviet Agriculture," [152, Part lI-B], Diamond and Krueger,
"Recent Developments in Output and Productivity in Soviet Agriculture" in [1531 and
Volin [155]. For a review of the situation before 1958, see Golev [36] and Kartashova [43].
30Section 21 of the "Sample Statute for Collective Farms" (adopted by the Kolkhoz
Conference held in November 1969) deals with relations with the State Bank, including
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made from the State Bank's own general resources. Previously
such loans were made from special budget appropriations, with
the Bank acting merely as allocator and administrator with little
interest in their repayment.
Official statistics suggest that a good measure of success was
achieved in increasing the use of credit by kolkhozes during the
first years following the shift to the new policy. By 1969, kolk-
hozes had become heavy users of credit; at the end of the year, 94
percent of them had some outstanding long-term indebtedness to
the State Bank. Short-term credit financed more than one-third of
all current production expenditures of the kolkhozes, including
the wages of the membership. In 1969, kolkhozes received bank
loans amounting to almost 13 billion rubles, including 1.9 billion
rubles in long-term loans, which covered 28 percent of all invest-
ment in fixed assets and livestock. Fixed investment in kolkhozes,
only an estimated 5 billion rubles in 1935, exceeded 40 billion
rubles in 1969, but only a small part of the increment was credit-
financed (bank credit is extended only for a limited range of
construction projects).3'
Greater stress is now placed on increasing the availability to,
and the use of credit by, kolkhozes, and to provide appropriate
incentives to this end. In the past loans were frequently regarded
as disguised subsidies, and the State Bank kept many loans to
kolkhozes on its books long past their original maturity dates by
granting extensions irrespective of the effort made by borrowers
to repay them. Given the minuscule amount of bank credit
extended to kolkhozes in the four decades following the forced
collectivization, a vast need remains for expanding the use of
industry-produced inputs, such as fertilizers and insecticides, and
for increasing investment in equipment, livestock, and farm
dwellings as well as in such amenities as electric power, telephone
lines, movie theatres, educational and recreational facilities.
31Bank credit is still, for instance, not available for the financing of irrigation, drainage,
or the construction of feeder roads or roads entirely within the territory of a single kolkhoz.
See Kartashova [43].
When medium- and long-term lending to agriculture was shifted to the State Bank in
1958 and the modest program of loans for small-scale technological improvements in
• industry was revitalized, the distinction between short- and long-term loans was underlined
by making appropriations from the budget to the State Bank for dispensing such loans.130 The Role and Structure of Credit
To stimulate capital formation from retained funds, taxation of
kolkhozes was modified in 1966 by shifting the tax base from gross
to net income. By exempting profits up to 15 percent of net The rigidityo
income from taxation and by lowering the tax rate to 12 percent interest has'
(instead of 12.5 percent previously applicable to gross income), reluctance to
the new system made the income tax, in fact, progressive. It is consjderec
lowered the total tax burden on kolkhozes by an estimated half a income" in
billion rubles a year, and encouraged modern farming methods. merely as a
Greater official concern with making kolkhozes conduct their operating co
affairs in a businesslike manner (rather than as the lowest admin- before the p
istrative unit of a vast bureaucracy running agricultural produc-
tion) has also led to a number of changes in internal accounting bank loans
and financing.32 Among these the allocation of part of the profits between the
for a systematic increase in working capital is, perhaps, the most Reform has
important. these directi(
Sovkhozes benefit from several changes in financing, too. They Rates are
are now able to maintain two separate funds for financing fixed The somewh
investments and other expenses designed to improve income in mid-1950s
the long run. The "sovkhoz fund" and the "fund for the strength- tion of credit
ening and widening of activity" receive 4 and 8 percent, respec- social targets
tively, of planned profits and 40 to 50 percent, respectively, of any Changes ii
additional (above plan) profits. These funds can be used for a wide result of higi
variety of projects not included in the economic plan. The pur- Finance. Nei'
poses for which these resources may be spent, however, are to credit det
spelled out in great detail. Therefore, the second fund, for demand for r
example, may be directed only toward investments in such proj- on availabilit
ects as electrification and telephone and radiocommunications rates do not i
and the erection of field markers. Projects can be initiated only for loanable I
when centrally allocated ("funded") resources are not involved. The level o
This excludes a wide range of investment activities; it is not readily significantly s
clear, for instance, how electrification projects can be financed charged rang
from these sovkhoz resources when wire, transformers, and other and for
equipment are on the scarcity list.33 percent for k
been high in c
borrowed wo
the former
32For a standardfinancialplan of a kolkhoz,seeSolntsev andFisenko[82],particularly
pp. 280—282. W 1 e
"See Yunik and Moseyuk [91], PP. 37—43. 1965 Reforminterest Rates 131
taxation of Interest Rates
from gross
àrcent of net The rigidity of interest rates reflects the view of policy makers that
fto 12 percent interest has no regulating function in a socialist economy. Their
'ross income), reluctance to vary interest rates may be traceable to the fact that it
It is considered a particularly objectionable source of "parasite
timated half a income" in capitalist countries. As a result, interest is treated
methods. merely as a service charge intended to contribute to meeting
conduct their operating costs of the banking system. No attempt was made
owest admin- before the Reform to use the level of interest rates and their
Itural produc- differentiation to influence the aggregate volume or distribution of
accounting bank loans and real investment, or to achieve equilibrium
of the profits between the demand for and supply of loanable funds. The
aps, the most Reform has done little toward moving the use of interest rates in
these directions.
ng, too. They Rates are uniform for all loans made for an identical purpose.
Lnancing fixed The somewhat greater differentiation in interest rates since the
income in mid-1950s was not designed to influence the volume or distribu-
the strength- tion of credit, but, rather, to implement certain preferences as to
respec- social targets by the planning authorities.
of any Changes in lending rates are made infrequently, and are the
sed for a wide result of high-level administrative decisions in the Ministry of
lan. The pur- Finance. Neither deposit nor lending rates are varied in response
however, are to credit demands, or in order to influence them; as long as
nd fund, for demand for real resources is not dependent in any important way
in such proj- on availability of financial resources (including credit), interest
rates do not need to be set at a level designed to clear the market
initiated only for loanable funds.
not involved. The level of interest rates on short-term loans has been reduced
is not readily significantly since the credit reforms of 1930—1932, when the rate
i be financed charged ranged from 8 percent for loans for carrying inventories
ers, and other and for advances on drafts in the process of collection to 15
percent for loans past due; penalty rates on past-due loans have
been high in order to achieve maximum speed in the turnover of
borrowed working capital. (See Table 6.7.) By the end of 1965,
the former were reduced to 2 percent and 1 percent, respectively,
:0[82],particularly while the penalty rate was lowered to 5 percent. Since prior to the



































Annual Rates of Interest on Short-term Loans
For Firms Operating
. Followingthe in 1968 Under the
Credit Reforms of 1934— Old Reform
Type of Loan 1930—1931 1936 1936System System
Planned inventory loans 8 6 4 2
Loans on drafts covering
goods in transit 8 4 2 1
Other loans 15 8 6 5 8
SOURCE: [13],p. 85 and Mamonova [1901.
Equals or approximates the rate charged on funds owned by a given enterprise
and thus differentiated by industry and location. This rate applies to enterprises charged
6 percent for funds owned, which is the case for the majority of enterprises.
profits normally set on a cost-plus basis, enterprises had no desire
to lower rates. As a result of the Reform, to induce enterprises to
avoid building up excessive inventories interest is now charged
against actual gross profits and thus diminishing funds available for
bonus payments and other enterprise uses. Later interest rates
have been raised for all categories of loans (including inventory
credit), except for loans on drafts covering goods in transit.34
Since the Reform was initiated there has been considerable
discussion about the level at which interest rates ought to be set,
and whether and how they should be manipulated. These discus-
sions have yielded little convincing reasoning as to the desirable
term structure of rates and differentiation by purpose or branch
of industry. Every specific end use, or type of borrower, continues
to command one specific rate, determined by the central authori-
ties and uniformly applied without regard to the financial position
of the borrower. The differentiation of rates according to purpose
has been increased, but not depending on prospective economic
effectiveness of the credit.
34Several Soviet economists have been advocating a more flexible use of interest rates,
as well as a greater differentiation of rates within a wider range, from 2 to 10 percent, for
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The rate applicable to any given transaction continues to be
determined by the loan's formal characteristics and does not
depend on the judgment of bank officials. The new system is
merely designed to remove some of the most obvious defects of
the standard system and to adjust lending rates to the new fixed
charge for fixed and working capital. The only change is that rates
are now set at the same level as the capital charges applied to the
particular industrial branch concerned. Evidently, loan rates
lower than the charge on owned working capital would induce
enterprises to seek maximum financing of inventories and other
working capital needs through bank credit. The new minimum
lending rates for plan-approved uses are equal to the applicable
capital charge (normally 6 percent, but for some enterprises as
high as 10 percent and as low as 3 percent). The rates for loans
carrying inventories in excess of the applicable "norms" are
similarly differentiated. Interest costs for various purposes other
than carrying planned inventories worked out in 1972 to about 7
percent (as compared with the uniform charge on short-term loans
of 2 percent prior to the Reform). Even higher rates apply for
loans past due.
In a modest way, the Bank can now also use variations in rates
to achieve what before was considered the proper object of
administrative action. Thus, poor performers, who previously
merely needed the guarantee of higher-echelon authorities to
obtain additional loans on which regular rates were charged, now
have to pay 20 percent above these rates. Similarly, exceptional
loan accommodations to enterprises experiencing temporary
financial difficulties will now involve a 1 percent surcharge. Alto-
gether, the Bank's interest in the level and structure of interest
rates continued to be greatly reduced by the fact that the bulk of
its interest receipts is payable directly to the budget. There is
little evidence that any reliance on rate flexibility, as contrasted
with rate differentiation, is intended.